Dieses Buch bietet die umfassende neuere Darstellung und Analyse des ganzen Hegelschen Systems. Dabei wird Hegels Philosophie in einer klaren und leichtverständlichen Sprache einer immanenten Kritik unterzogen, die sich weder in Paraphrasen erschöpft noch mit der Versicherung entgegengesetzter Behauptung ihr Ende findet. "Ein wirklich faszinierendes Werk, das das systematische Philosophieren selbst erneut zu wecken vermag" Philosophisches Jahrbuch.

The paper provides a reconstruction of the notion of material Apriori while exhibiting the anti-Kantian inspiration and factual grounding thereof. The attempt is made to show that a non-formal Apriori obtains because the sensuous has a normative character; further, that the difference between material and formal eidetic laws is rooted in the difference between sensuous contents, given in experience, and intellectual contents, originating in activities of judgement. The material Apriori is not independent of all experience, since it is grounded on (...) sensuous eidetic contents and thus depends on the latter’s givenness and characteristics. It is thanks precisely to this ,contingency‘ that it has an ontological significance. (shrink)

Vittorio Hösle , , | : Cet article ambitionne de comprendre la crise écologique dans sa portée métaphysique. Pour ce faire, l’auteur analyse d’abord ce qu’il considère comme l’interprétation métaphysique la plus courante de cette crise, soit la métaphysique de l’esprit, qui trouve sa source dans une lecture simpliste de la pensée de G.W.F. Hegel. Ensuite, il examine les deux principales critiques adressées à cette métaphysique de l’esprit, soit d’une part l’interprétation heideggérienne de l’histoire de l’être et, d’autre part, (...) le panthéisme naturaliste d’inspiration écologiste dont le philosophe allemand Klaus Michael Meyer-Abich est le principal représentant. Enfin, en guise de synthèse, l’auteur élabore sa propre analyse en mettant en lumière le phénomène d’éloignement croissant de la subjectivité et de l’être à l’époque moderne comme la principale source métaphysique de la présente crise écologique. | : This article aims to understand the ecological crisis in its metaphysical significance. To do so, the author first analyzes what he sees as the most common metaphysical interpretation of the crisis, viz. the metaphysics of the mind, which is rooted in a simplistic reading of the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel. Next, he examines the two main criticisms of the metaphysics of mind, on the one hand, Heidegger’s interpretation of the history of Being and, on the other hand, the naturalistic ecologist pantheism best represented by the German philosopher Klaus Michael Meyer-Abich. Finally, by way of summary, the author develops his own analysis by highlighting the phenomenon of growing alienation of subjectivity and Being in modern times as the main metaphysical source of the current ecological crisis. (shrink)

The paper examines Althusser’s readings of Gramsci, from the first critical notes and annotations to his writings on the crisis of Marxism. It highlights the profound ambivalence of Althusser’s interpretations. On the one hand, Gramsci is presented as a precursor, as the only figure within the Marxist tradition deemed to have attempted to think the superstructure, and in particular the political. On the other side, the Gramscian corpus is criticized as the paradigmatic instance of a conception of temporality and politics (...) with which Althusser is in disagreement. Regarding the Althusserian critique, we here identify two distinct phases starting out from a critique of the lack of knowledge of the specific status of science in general, especially of the science of history, characteristic of the second half of the sixties, Althusser would, in the late seventies, formulate a critique of the Gramscian concept of hegemony which, in his view, erases the question of class domination. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz will nachweisen, dass Husserls Denken in der Tat eine Erledigung des Cartesianismus darstellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass Husserls Denken eine ganz andere Auffassung der Wahrnehmung und der Evidenz als Descartes zugrunde liegt. Denn – im Vorgriff auf eine Einsicht, die gegenwärtig in der analytischen Philosophie vertreten wird – meint Husserl, eine Wahrnehmung oder Evidenz könne nur aufgrund anderer Wahrnehmungen oder Evidenzen bezweifelt werden. Deshalb setzt jede solche Bezweifelung das Vertrauen in die Wahrnehmung oder Evidenz voraus und kann nicht (...) die Wahrnehmung oder Evidenz als solche betreffen, sondern lediglich ihre einzelnen Fälle. Demzufolge ist die phänomenologische Reduktion nicht eine Art methodischer Zweifel, und das Husserlsche cogito hat nicht dieselbe Bedeutung wie das Cartesianische cogito. All das beruht auf einer Auffassung der Wirklichkeit, deren Kern in der Identifikation von Wirklichkeit und Erfahrbarkeit liegt, die aber keine Reduktion der Dinge auf das Bewusstsein impliziert. (shrink)

The paper provides a reconstruction of the notion of genetic phenomenology while trying to demonstrate that its elaboration leads Husserl to dismiss de facto the main motivation of his idealism—namely the idea that at the basis of constitution is an immanent and formless stuff shaped or animated by subjective acts. Indeed genetic analysis shows that the original stuff of constitution consists of sensuous contents structured according to a material lawfulness grounded on their peculiarity. By affecting the subject, such contents motivate (...) the performing of intentional acts and are the genuine motor of constitution. The genetic ground of apperceptions is thus material content. (shrink)

de Bruin & Gallagher suggest that the view of embodied simulation put forward in our recent article lacks explanatory power. We argue that the notion of reuse of mental states represented with a bodily format provides a convincing simulational account of the mirroring mechanism and its role in mind -reading.

I develop a phenomenological critique to Husserl’s metaphysics, by showing that – contrary to what the majority of critical literature claims – metaphysical questions are alien to phenomenology. Husserl engages with the discussion of these topics only because of ideological-existential motives, and, when he deals with that problems, he does not use the phenomenological method, but the regressive and constructive procedure, which he himself elsewhere criticizes. Konsequent zu sein, ist die größte Obliegenheit eines Philosophen, und wird doch am seltensten angetroffen. (...) Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Die Vernunft ist immer beim Menschen die gehorsamste Dienerin des Herzens; was er wünscht, das stellt er sich als seiend vor und demonstriert er, wenn er einmal zu räsonieren anfängt, a priori aus der Vernunft als notwendig. Feuerbach, Die Unsterblichkeitsfrage vom Standpunkt der Anthropologie. It were better […] never to look beyond the present material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. (shrink)

This paper tries to show that Husserl’s phenomenology can be considered as a form of radical empiricism in the sense of James, since it holds—like traditionalempiricism—that sensuous experience is the foundation and the source of justifi cation of knowledge, but—in contrast with traditional empiricism—it holds that there are relations, which are given in the sensuous experience just as well contents. Reality is sensuous and the structure of reality is equally sensuous. By an analysis of the concepts of the sensuous relation, (...) of the material a priori, and of association, it is showed that Husserl—in contrast with transcendentalism—confers a normative role to the peculiarity of sensuous contents, which determines their objective connections and also the structure of the world before the intellectual activities of the subject. At the same time, it is pointed out that Husserl has never entirely gotten over the Cartesian psychologism of Brentano and of traditional empiricism, that leads him to consider only the immanent as properly present. Finally, the paper discusses Husserl’s concept of the life-world, which originates from Avenarius’ idea of the natural concept of the world, and his position regarding the relation between experience and science. (shrink)

How do we know what violence is? And how do we acquire knowledge of violence? The key to these questions can be found in the epistemology of testimony. Testimonies of violence are first-person narratives of violence, therefore unless first-person narratives are recognized and legitimized as philosophically and epistemologically valuable, our knowledge of violence would be seriously compromised. The value of testimonies of violence lies in part in the transmission of truth-claims, but also crucially in the speech-act of giving a testimony. (...) It is the latter that is the focus of this article. I will argue that the act of giving a testimony of violence, being listed to and believed, is essential for the survivor of violence in the process of rebuilding the sense of self and personhood in the aftermath of the violence endured.By looking at the work of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions worldwide, and highlighting in particular the role of trust within the dynamics of testimonies, I will argue that first-person testimonies of violence are also indispensable for another reason; namely, they prevent acts of violence from turning into instruments of epistemic injustice.Survivors of violence often find themselves being the victims of two forms of violence: apart from enduring the violence being afflicted on them, they also often suffer the epistemic injustice of being marginalized as credible sources of knowledge. Recognizing the validity of testimonies of violence in the form of first-person narratives of violence not only enables us to acquire knowledge of violence, but acknowledging the credibility of the narrator acts as a strong antidote to epistemic injustice. (shrink)

En el presente artículo, se expondrá la relevancia del rito en el trabajo del duelo, haciendo posible la transición de la muerte real a la simbólica. Para ello, se iniciará con una reflexión filosófica sobre la muerte, vinculándola con la definición lacaniana de “agujero en lo real”. Se buscará mostrar que, aunque el sujeto no puede evadir este fenómeno radical, aún puede actuar asumiéndolo. Posteriormente, se problematizará la distinción que establece Žižek entre la muerte simbólica y la real, ilustrada mediante (...) Hamlet y otras tragedias griegas clásicas. Luego, se analizará el concepto de “duelo” desde el psicoanálisis, abordando elementos de la reflexión freudiana y su conexión con la definición lacaniana de la muerte. Finalmente, se argumentará que el rito es esencial para la efectividad del duelo, permitiendo acoplar la muerte real a la simbólica y completando el fallecimiento en sus dos dimensiones. (shrink)

En el presente ensayo se buscará exponer, a través de una problematización histórica, la radical novedad filosófica que representa la teoría freudiana de la constitución de la autoconsciencia moral a partir de la introyección de la ley paterna. Para esto, se mostrarán, en primer lugar, los hitos históricamente relevantes que permitieron instalar una reflexión sobre la interioridad moral en la filosofía agustiniana, contraponiéndola con el pensamiento helénico clásico. Posteriormente, se expondrá la hipótesis nietzscheana sobre la aparición de la moralidad como (...) una estrategia de poder dentro de la tradición judeo-cristiana para, por un lado, mostrar sus insuficiencias y, por el otro, dar paso a la teoría freudiana de la formación de la consciencia moral como un proceso identificatorio con respecto a la figura del padre, lo que permite explicar el fenómeno de la autocrítica moral como un tipo particular de autodistanciamiento con respecto a sí. (shrink)

The sense of agency – the subjective feeling of being in control of our own actions – is one central aspect of the phenomenology of action. Computational models provided important contributions toward unveiling the mechanisms underlying the sense of agency in individual action. In particular, the sense of agency is believed to be related to the match between the actual and predicted consequences of our own actions (comparator model). In the study of joint action, models are even more necessary to (...) understand the mechanisms underlying the development of coordination strategies and how the subjective experiences of control emerge during the interaction. In a joint action, we not only need to predict the consequences of our own actions; we also need to predict the actions and intentions of our partner, and to integrate these predictions to infer their joint consequences. Understanding our partner and developing mutually satisfactory coordination strategies are key components of joint action and in the development of the sense of joint agency. Here we discuss a computational architecture which addresses the sense of agency during intentional, real-time joint action. We first reformulate previous accounts of the sense of agency in probabilistic terms, as the combination of prior beliefs about the action goals and constraints, and the likelihood of the predicted movement outcomes. To look at the sense of joint agency, we extend classical computational motor control concepts - optimal estimation and optimal control. Regarding estimation, we argue that in joint action the players not only need to predict the consequences of their own actions, but also need to predict partner’s actions and intentions (a ‘partner model’) and to integrate these predictions to infer their joint consequences. As regards action selection, we use differential game theory – in which actions develop in continuous space and time - to formulate the problem of establishing a stable form of coordination and as a natural extension of optimal control to joint action. The resulting model posits two concurrent observer-controller loops, accounting for ‘joint’ and ‘self’ action control. The two observers quantify the likelihoods of being in control alone or jointly. Combined with prior beliefs, they provide weighing signals which are used to modulate the ‘joint’ and ‘self’ motor commands. We argue that these signals can be interpreted as the subjective sense of joint and self agency. We demonstrate the model predictions by simulating a sensorimotor interactive task where two players are mechanically coupled and are instructed to perform planar movements to reach a shared final target by crossing two differently located intermediate targets. In particular, we explore the relation between self and joint agency and the information available to each player about their partner. The proposed model provides a coherent picture of the inter-relation of prediction, control, and the sense of agency in a broader range of joint actions. (shrink)

Research on elders’ acceptance of virtual technologies is much needed. Here we studied the user experience of elders (N = 10, mean age = 88.2 years) during virtual biking, an exergame where participants pedal on a cycle ergometer and wear a Head-Mounted Display that provides them an immersive experience of a bike ride. We tested the effects of augmented gaze on user experience. Augmented gaze is a condition in which horizontal head turns yield amplified visual shifts, which is assumed to (...) facilitate visual exploration. User experience was measured by asking participants to rate satisfaction, motivation, sense of presence and sense of safety. We found a very good acceptance of virtual biking and no signs of negative effects of augmented gaze. These preliminary observations suggest that augmented gaze may be a viable optimization of elders’ experience with certain virtual reality applications. (shrink)

In view of the incompatibility between scientific and manifest image one can either consider the scientific world as true and the sensuous world as merely subjective or consider the latter as true and the former as a subjective construction. Sellars holds the first position, namely scientific realism. By relying on Husserl, who holds the second position, I try to show that the first position has absurd consequences and is idealistic. For the measure of all things is not science, but perception.

I deal with the relation between phenomenology and realism while examining Ingarden’s critique towards Husserl. I exhibit the empiricist nucleus of Husserl’s phenomenology, according to which the real is what can be sensuously experienced. On this basis, I argue that Husserl’s phenomenology is not idealistic, in opposition to the realistic phenomenology, according to which reality consists in entities which cannot be sensuously experienced and are thus ideal. Finally I attempt to show that the idealistic elements of Husserl’s thinking do not (...) originate from the transcendental turn, but from a remainder of psychologism that contradicts his empiricism. (shrink)

The essay deals with an important epistemological debate in the Lucullus: Can there be remembrance of false beliefs, as Cicero argues against his interlocutor, who defends Antiochus’ position? It is shown that Antiochus, like Aristoteles, considers ‘remember’ to be a double achievement verb: Remembrance occurs only if a correct past perception is faithfully transmitted to the present. Cicero, on the other hand, insists that faithful transmission can also occur with false beliefs. The distinction seems to be analogous to that between (...) valid and sound inference in contemporary Stoic logic. Finally, I discuss differences between ancient and modern forms of skepticism, address the issue of why misremembering plays no role in the Lucullus, and find an answer in Cicero’s doctrine of the orator. (shrink)

This paper analyses the question of animals in the framework of the phenomenological problem of the common world. First, it underlines the contrast between Husserl’s idea of animals as subjects acting in accordance with a motivation, and the views of Descartes, Heidegger and Sellars, who consider animal behaviour as mechanical or instinctive. After an account of the phenomenological approach to the question of the common world and of Husserl’s position concerning animals, it is showed that the results of scientific research (...) on animal behaviour mainly confirm that position. (shrink)

O presente trabalho destaca o grande valor da filosofia prática kantiana, que se constitui, sem dúvida, num marco na história da reflexão ética ocidental. Num segundo momento, o autor apresenta algumas críticas a determinadas posições kantianas, destacando, no entanto, que uma reflexão ética adequada para 0 nosso tempo terá, necessariamente, de levar em consideração a fundamentação metafísica da Ética defendida por Kant.

The article proposes a comparison between Althusser and Derrida on the question of temporality through the two Marx's reading sub specie theatri set by the two authors in Pour Marx and in Spectres de Marx. From this comparison emerges that the althusserian theory of temporality is beyond the teleology of the hegelo-marxist tradition, but also of the messianism without messiah that is at the core of the Derrida's interpretation of Marx strongly influenced by Benjamin. In this sense, in a provocative (...) way, it can be said that in Althusser the escatology is à la cantonade.O autor propõe um confronto entre Althusser e Derrida acerca da questão da temporalidade, focalizando a leitura que os dois autores fazem de Marx sub specie theatri. A partir desse confronto, emerge uma teoria da temporalidade althusseriana, a qual se encontra para além, quer da teleologia da tradição hegeliano-marxista, quer do messianismo sem Messias proposto por Derrida, em sua releitura benjaminiana de Marx. Nesse sentido, a escatologia em Althusser é pensável somente à la cantonade. (shrink)

The essay explores the development of sociobiology, its basic tenets, and its contributions to the study of human nature as well as ethics. It insists that Darwinism is more than a biological theory and presents a possibility of interpreting sociobiology as manifesting not the triumph of the selfish gene but, on the contrary, the only way in which the expansion of altruism was possible.

Knowledge transmission and universality of man in global society -- The other and the paradoxes of universalism -- Religion, human rights, and political conflicts -- Europe : common values and a common identity -- The public sphere and political space -- America and Europe : Carl Schmitt and Alexis de Tocqueville -- Identity and human rights : a glance at Europe from afar -- Human rights, universalism, and cosmopolitanism.